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Abstract 
This study aims to identify the preferences of the monetary authority in the Peruvian 
regime of inflation targeting through the derivation of optimal monetary rules. To achieve 
that, we used a calibration strategy based on the choice of values of the parameters 
of preferences that minimize the square deviation between the true interest rate and 
interest rate optimal simulation. The results showed that the monetary authority has 
applied a system of flexible inflation targeting, prioritizing the stabilization of inflation, 
but without disregarding gradualism in interest rates. On the other hand, concern over 
output stabilization has been minimal, revealing that the output gap has been important 
because it contains information about future inflation and not because it is considered 
a variable goal in itself. Finally, when the smoothing of the nominal exchange rate is 
considered in the loss function of the monetary authority, the rank order of preferences 
has been maintained and the smoothing of the exchange rate proved insignificant. 
Keywords
inflation target, central bank preferences, optimal monetary rules, Central Bank of 
Peru
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Resumo
Este estudo objetiva identificar as preferências da autoridade monetária peruana sob 
o regime de metas de inflação através da derivação de regras monetárias ótimas. Para 
atingir tal objetivo, nós usamos uma estratégia de calibração baseada na escolha dos 
valores dos parâmetros de preferências que minimizam o desvio quadrático entre a ver-
dadeira taxa de juros e a taxa de juros ótima simulada. Os resultados evidenciaram que 
autoridade monetária tem aplicado um regime de metas de inflação flexível, priorizando 
a estabilização da inflação, mas sem ter desprezado o gradualismo da taxa de juros. Por 
outro lado, a preocupação pela estabilização do produto tem sido mínima, revelando 
que o hiato do produto tem sido importante porque ela contém informação sobre a 
inflação futura e não porque seja considerada como uma variável meta em si mesma. 
Finalmente, quando o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio nominal é considerado na fun-
ção perda da autoridade monetária, a ordem de importância das preferências tem-se 
mantido, e o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio apresentou um peso insignificante. 
Palavras-Chave
metas de inflação, preferências do banco central, regras monetárias ótimas, Banco 
Central do Peru
1. Introduction
In recent years, a large number of academic researchers, as well as 
of researchers from other areas, have strived to unravel the real in-
centives associated with policymakers’ actions in response to macro-
economic development. Their justification is that monetary policy 
follows a systematic strategy, driven by preferences related to the 
achievement of certain targets. 
The empirical literature in the past two decades has produced evi-
dence in favor of improved efficiency of monetary policy in coun-
tries which have adopted the inflation targeting regime. In the case 
of Peru, this regime was formally introduced in 2002 and, even 
though inflation targets had been announced since 1994, there was 
no explicit institutional commitment towards their accomplishment. 
Under the new regime, however, the Peruvian monetary authority 
lifted the control over the monetary base as policy instrument and 
propounded an interest rate announcement policy. In this case, the 
Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRBP) establishes its monetary policy 
instrument in order to meet the targets outlined for the economic 
variables, such as inflation or output, in which the weights attached 
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to the loss function depend on the preferences given to each of the 
established goals. On the other hand, notwithstanding an evident 
policy geared towards price stability in an inflation targeting regime, 
the monetary authority is less clear about its other monetary policy 
goals. 
Given the objectives and the instrument by which the monetary 
authority is guided in the inflation targeting regime, it is possible to 
rely on a functional relation (monetary rule) that combines both ele-
ments and that also considers relevant economic variables. Therefore, 
ever since the seminal work by Taylor (1993), several monetary po-
licy rule specifications have been proposed to describe the response 
of central banks to economic variables. Conversely, in theory, the 
interest rate rules can be derived as the solution to an intertemporal 
optimization problem restricted to the economic structure, where 
the monetary authority seeks to minimize the loss associated with 
deviations of the objective variables from their respective targets.1 
Nevertheless, as shown by Svensson (1999), the coefficients of the 
interest rate rules derived through this method are complex com-
binations of the parameters correlated with the economic structure 
and with the monetary authority’s preferences.
The present paper aims to identify the preferences of the Peruvian 
monetary authority under the inflation targeting regime by deri-
ving optimal monetary rules. Knowing about the preferences of the 
authority in charge of the monetary policy is paramount, not only 
because this will allow understanding the conduct of the interest 
rate policy, i.e., it will be possible to verify whether the observed 
economic results are compatible with an optimal monetary policy, 
but also because of its influence on the formation of future expecta-
tions by economic agents. Due to the important role of expectations 
in determining macroeconomic variables, the identification of mone-
tary authority’s preferences becomes even more important. Finally, 
this will also allow us to know what economic variables enter the 
loss function.
In the present study, we will infer the preferences of the CRBP by 
applying a calibration strategy. Basically, this strategy is based on the 
selection of preference parameter values that minimize the squared 
1  For further details, see Walsh (2003), Svensson (1999), Castelnuevo and Surico (2003).
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deviation between the actual interest rate path and a simulated op-
timal interest rate. 
It is necessary to underscore, though, that the proposed method is 
different from those applied to Peru. For instance, GMM, applied 
by Rodriguez (2008), is based on the estimation of a three-equation 
system, namely: supply curves, demand curves and an equation for 
the monetary rule that solves the central bank’s optimization pro-
blem, and whose results rely on the imposition of a finite policy 
horizon (four quarters) for the problem with the monetary authority. 
In our work, it is not necessary to impose a finite horizon, and just 
like Rodriguez (2008), we will use information on economic cons-
traint to solve the stochastic linear regulator problem. On the other 
hand, Bejarano (2001) estimates a VAR to capture the dynamics of 
the economy, but he refers to a simple model for estimation of the 
preferences of the Peruvian central bank. 
Most of the international literature on policymakers’ preferences 
has been devoted to estimating Federal Reserve (FED) preferences. 
Some noteworthy studies include the following: Salemi (1995), on 
the use of the optimal linear quadratic control described by Chow 
(1981); Dennis (2006), Dennis (2004) and Ozlale (2003), on maxi-
mum likelihood; Favero and Rovelli (2003), on GMM; llbas (2008), 
on Bayesian methods; Söderlind et al. (2002) and Castelnuevo and 
Surico (2003), on a calibration process. These studies demonstrated 
that the FED has given greater preference for inflation stabilization 
as well as for interest rate smoothing, whereas output stabilization 
appears to have been neglected.
The international literature also addresses preference estimations for 
other central banks in addition to the FED. For instance, Cecchetti 
and Ehrmann (1999) estimated preferences for 23 countries (inclu-
ding nine inflation targeters) and Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimated 
preferences for central banks of countries belonging to the European 
Monetary Union. In both studies, the authors used VAR and found 
evidence that the trade-off between inflation and output has va-
ried considerably among different countries, with heavier weight 
being placed on inflation rather than on output variability. Collins 
and Siklos (2004) estimated the preferences for central banks of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States (USA), using 
GMM, and found that central banks can be described by an optimal 
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inflation targeting regime with significant weight on interest rate 
smoothing and a lesser weight on the output gap. Tachibana (2003) 
estimated the preferences for central banks of Japan, the UK and the 
USA after the first oil shock. The author showed that these coun-
tries increased their aversion to inflation volatility, especially from 
the 1980s onwards. Rodriguez (2008) estimated the preferences for 
the Bank of Canada for different subsamples and, to that purpose, 
he used GMM. The author evidenced that the monetary authority’s 
preferences changed across regimes, chiefly the parameter associated 
with the implicit inflation target, which has significantly decreased. 
Finally, Aragón and Portugal (2009) identified the preferences of 
the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) in the inflation targeting regime 
using a calibration process and found evidence that the CBB adop-
ted a flexible inflation targeting regime, placing larger emphasis on 
inflation stabilization. Moreover, the authors showed that the CBB 
was much more concerned with the smoothing of the Selic interest 
rate than with output stabilization.
Empirical studies on the preferences of the CRBP are scarce. Within 
this line of research, we highlight three studies: Goñi and Ormeño 
(2000), using GMM and monetary base as monetary policy instru-
ment, determined the preferences of CRBP for the 1990s. The au-
thors found that the CRBP had a greater preference for inflation sta-
bilization and for exchange rate depreciation and a lesser preference 
for the output gap. In the same vein as Cecchetti and Krause (2001) 
and Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), Bejarano (2001) estimated the 
preferences of the CRBP for the 1990s. The author demonstrated 
that the CRBP had a larger preference for inflation rather than for 
output variability, concluding that the behavior of monetary policy 
in the 1990s was not far from inflation targeting. Finally, Rodriguez 
(2008), following Favero and Rovelli (2003), estimates the prefe-
rences of the CRBP for different regimes.2 Using GMM, the author 
found evidence that the implicit inflation target has significantly 
decreased and that the Peruvian monetary policy may have been 
efficiently conducted in the last regime (1994:2-2005:4).
The present paper contributes to the existing empirical literature 
on Peru using a different sample, specifically the inflation targe-
ting regime, and also a different method (calibration) to determi-
2  For further details on the classification of monetary policy regimes in Peru, see Castillo et 
al. (2007a). 
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ne the preferences of the CRBP. Results showed that the Peruvian 
monetary authority in the inflation targeting regime has adopted 
a flexible monetary policy, being largely concerned with inflation 
stability, followed by considerable concern with interest rate smoo-
thing. However, the preference for output stability and exchange 
rate smoothing has been negligible. 
Our study is organized into three sections, in addition to the intro-
duction. Section 2 shows the development of the theoretical model 
and the central bank’s optimization problem, as well as the strategy 
for calibration of the monetary authority’s preferences. Section 3 
addresses the estimation results for the structure of the economy 
and identifies the preferences of the Peruvian monetary authority, 
based on a monetary policy analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Macroeconomic Model 
The CRBP has a dynamic optimal control problem whose solution 
is contemplated in its policy actions. These are the optimal respon-
ses of the monetary authority to economic development, which are 
captured by the relationships between state variables and the control 
variable (the monetary policy instrument).
In what follows, we describe the dynamics of the state variables ba-
sed on the structure of the economy that restricts the policymaker’s 
optimization problem as well as the derivation of the optimal mone-
tary rule. Finally, we show the steps used in the calibration strategy 
for determining the policy preferences of the CRBP.
2.1    Economic Structure
When central banks optimize, they are subject to the restriction 
imposed by the behavior of the economic structure. In this paper, 
we describe a structural macroeconomic model for the Peruvian 
economy with backward-looking expectations. The proposed model 
is based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999) and Aragón and 
Portugal (2009). The dynamics governing the four equations that 
make up the model is given by:
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 1 , 1t t q t
q q                   (3)
 1 1 , 1t t tt t
tt tt                 (4)
where: t  is the annualized quarterly inflation rate, measured by 
, where tp  is the consumer price index 
for the metropolitan region of Lima; tq is the nominal exchan-
ge rate; ty  is the output gap percentage between the real GDP 
and potential GDP, i.e., , whe-
re 
t
GDP  and *
t
GDP are the real and potential gross domestic pro-
duct, respectively; ttt  is the terms of trade gap defined as the 
percentage difference of the terms of trade from their trend, i.e., 
, where realtt  denotes the terms of 
trade index and *ttt is the potential terms of trade index. For the 
gap variables, the trend values were calculated using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Finally, tr  stands for the real interest rate, defined 
as the difference between the nominal interest rate and regarded as 
monetary policy instrument, ti , and inflation rate, t . All variables 
are expressed as deviations from the mean; therefore, no constant 
appears in system (1) - (4). The terms , 1t  , , 1y t  , , 1q t   and , 1tt t   are 
construed as supply shocks, demand shocks, exchange rate shocks 
and terms of trade shocks, respectively. 
Equation (1) can be seen as a Phillips curve that shows that the cur-
rent inflation rate depends on its lagged values, on the fluctuation of 
the exchange rate in the previous period and on the two-period lag 
of the output gap. The verticality of the Phillips curve is imposed by 
the restriction that the sum of the lagged inflation parameters and 
of the fluctuation in the exchange rate should be equal to 1. This 
means that any exchange rate depreciation is totally transferred to 
prices in the long run.
The IS curve, expressed by Equation (2), shows the relationship 
of the output gap with its lagged values, with the real interest rate 
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lagged two periods and with the terms of trade gap lagged one pe-
riod.3 The importance to include the latter variable in the aggregate 
demand equation is that, because Peru has a small open economy, it 
is vulnerable to external shocks that affect the aggregate demand. 
The terms of trade, which have a close relationship with economic 
fluctuations, mainly after the implementation of the inflation tar-
geting regime (Castillo et al., 2007b),4 are one of the variables that 
capture this vulnerability.
According to Equations (3) and (4), the exchange rate is assumed to 
follow a random walk and the terms of trade are believed to follow 
a first-order autoregressive process for the sake of simplification of 
the model.5
The coefficients that follow the exchange rate depreciation and the 
output gap in the Phillips curve equation are expected to be positive, 
i.e. 3 40 0and   , respectively. In addition, a negative sign is ex-
pected for the real interest rate coefficient in the IS curve equation, 
3 0  , and so is a positive sign for the terms of trade coefficient, 
1 0  . 
Although the model described here is parsimonious, it has two 
advantages: i) it simplifies the solution to the intertemporal opti-
mization problem by the policymaker, as it simplifies that state-
space representation of the economic structure; and ii) it captures 
an important channel for the transmission of monetary policy, the 
aggregate demand channel. In regard to the latter, an increase in the 
interest rate, ti , which causes the real interest rate to deviate from 
its long-term trend, reduces the output gap after two quarters and 
the inflation rate after four quarters.
While the empirical success of the proposed model has been docu-
mented by studies conducted for developed economies, such as the 
works of Rudebusch and Svensson (1998, 1999) for the USA, and for 
emerging economies, undertaken by Aragón and Portugal (2009) for 
3  The assumption that the output gap depends on the real interest rate lagged two periods is 
supported by the analysis of cross-correlograms and by the evidence provided by Castillo et 
al. (2007b, p.35).
4  The importance of terms of trade to the Peruvian aggregate demand is highlighted by Cas-
tillo et al. (2007b) and by the Modelo de Proyección Trimestral del BCRP (2009).
5  The assumption that the exchange rate equation follows a random walk is based on the best 
fit for these data, as described in Section 3.
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Brazil, it is important to pinpoint the advantages and disadvantages 
of using this type of backward-looking models. 
Backward-looking models have been supported by both acade-
mic economists and monetary authorities, and their application in 
several research studies is frequent, as occurs in Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1998, 1999), Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), 
Dennis (2006), Collins and Skilos (2004), among others. In addi-
tion, Fuhrer (1997) compared backward-looking and forward-looking 
models, with favorable results for the former. According to Estrella 
and Fuhrer (2002), models with forward-looking expectations tend 
not to fit the data well, unlike the models proposed by Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1998, 1999). Woodford (2000, 2004), however, ascri-
bes the fact that monetary policy is optimal, to some extent, to its 
history, or in other words, to its backward-looking behavior. Finally, 
models that employ rational expectations have been often unable to 
do without backward-looking elements in models for the structure 
of the economy (Collins and Skilos, 2004).
On the other hand, backward-looking models show considerable pa-
rameter instability, and are subject to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 
1976). To overcome this hindrance, in the present paper, we con-
sider one single monetary regime such as the “inflation targeting 
regime.”
2.2     Central Bank Preferences and Optimal Monetary Policy
The monetary authority’s goal is to minimize the value expected 
from the loss function:
 
0
t tE LOSS








           
                (5)
where:
                  (6)
where   is the intertemporal discount rate, 0 1  , tE  is the 
expectations operator conditional on the set of information 
available at t  and in which all weights are greater than or equal 
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to zero, 0, 0 0
iy
and     .
6 With this objective function, 
the monetary authority is assumed to stabilize annual inflation,
3
0
1
4
a
t t jj
    , around an inflation target, * , to maintain the ou-
tput gap closed at zero and to smooth the nominal interest rate. 
We take for granted that the inflation target is fixed over time and 
normalized to zero given that all variables are expressed as deviations 
from their respective means.7 Output gap targets and interest rate 
smoothing are also assumed to be zero. The parameters that measure 
the monetary authority’s policy preferences, ,
iy
and   , indicate 
the importance given by the monetary authority to stabilization of 
inflation and of the output gap, and to interest rate smoothing, res-
pectively. Finally, we assume that policy preferences add up to one, 
i.e., 1
iy
     .
The formulation of the loss function in (6) has been commonly used 
in the literature to identify central bank preferences, and is attrac-
tive for numerous reasons. First, a quadratic loss function subject 
to a linear restriction facilitates the derivation of optimal moneta-
ry rules by means of restricted optimization methods, specifically 
with respect to the stochastic linear regulator problem.8 Second, 
the specification of loss function (6) allows the monetary authori-
ty to smooth the nominal interest rate, in addition to the goals of 
stabilization of inflation and output. Finally, as shown by Woodford 
(2002), a specification of loss function similar to (6) can be derived 
as a second-order approximation of an intertemporal utility function 
of the representative agent.
Many are the reasons for including interest rate smoothing in the 
central bank’s loss function. Amongst the most common reasons, we 
highlight the following: uncertainty over the key economic parame-
ters caused by uncertainty over economic information that, conse-
quently, encourages the central bank to adopt prudent monetary po-
licy actions in an attempt to reduce uncertainty costs (Castelnuovo 
6 When discount factor 0  , intertemporal loss function (6) approaches the unconditional 
mean of the loss function at time t:  (see 
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999).
7 Expressing all the variables that restrict the structure of the economy to deviation of the 
mean from the inflation target normalized at zero does not alter the derivation of monetary 
authority’s preferences, as demonstrated by Dennis (2006), Castelnuevo and Surico (2003) 
and Ozlale (2003).
8 For further details, see Miranda and Fackler (2002, p. 233) and Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(2004, p.110-114)
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and Surico, 2003, Sack and Wieland, 1999); difficulty in understan-
ding whether the problems under analysis originate from merely eco-
nomic shocks or from measurement errors in the data; large interest 
rate oscillations may lead to loss of reputation or of credibility of 
the monetary authority (Dennis, 2006); large interest rate volatility 
may result in capital loss, thus impairing the financial sector (Ozlale, 
2003); announcement of a short disinflation horizon might not mea-
sure up to the expectations of the economic agents and, therefore, it 
might not be dependable, requiring some gradualism (Rojas, 2002). 
Finally, the inclusion of interest rate smoothing together with other 
relevant variables (such as inflation, output and exchange rate) for a 
small open economy is crucial in an inflation target regime in order 
to try to meet the inflation target.
In the current inflation targeting regime, the Peruvian monetary 
authority has apparently paid a lot of attention to the evolutionary 
behavior of the exchange rate. In the present study, this possibility is 
contemplated for the following reasons. First, unlike other emerging 
economies which have adopted the inflation targeting regime, the 
Peruvian currency is partially dollar-pegged, where the exchange 
rate is the most relevant financial asset price for the stability of the 
financial system. Thus, in dollarized economies such as Peru, abrupt 
exchange rate fluctuations result in high costs for the financial sys-
tem, as well as for families whose debts are denominated in U.S. 
dollars (Reporte inflação BCRP, 2009). Second, monetary authority’s 
interventions in the exchange rate market are believed to have a dis-
guised precautionary motive – accumulation of international reserves 
to tackle negative external shocks.9 Given these aspects, a second 
exercise was developed, where exchange rate smoothing, q∆ , is re-
garded as the fourth goal of the Peruvian monetary authority. In this 
case, the loss function is described as:
      (7)
where the sum of the coefficients is assumed to be one, i.e., 
1
i qy
        .
To derive the optimal monetary rule, first we have to set the op-
timization restriction in state-space form. The restriction on the 
9   For further details on CRBP interventions in the exchange rate market, see Reporte Inflação 
(2008, 2009).
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optimization problem is described by the structure of the economy, 
given by system (1)-(4). This system has a convenient state-space 
representation, given by:
 1 1t t t tX AX Bi                             (8)
Where the elements of Equation (8) are given by:
  (9)
1 2 1 2 4 5 4 4
3 1 2 4 3
1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
;
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A B
       
    

      
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
     
, 1
, 1
1
, 1
, 1
0
0
0
;
0
0
0
t
y t
t
q t
tt t










 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  (10)
where 1tX +  is a 10x1 vector, which represents the state variables, ti  
is the control variable for the policy (nominal interest rate) and 1t   
is a vector containing supply and demand shocks, which are assumed 
to be normally i.i.d with zero mean and constant variances.
After that, the central bank’s loss function must be set in its matrix 
form. To do that, it is necessary to express it in terms of state and 
control variables, as follows:
 t x t i tZ C X C i= +                                                   (11)
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where:10
1
1/ 4 1/ 4 1/ 4 1/ 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
; 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ; 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
a
t
t t x i
t t
Z y C C
i i


     
            
          
     (12)
So, loss function (6) can be written as:    
 't t tLOSS Z KZ=                                                         (13)
where K  is a 3x3 diagonal matrix, whose diagonal contains the 
preference parameters of the monetary authority ( , y iand   ). 
Substituting Equation (11) into Equation (13), the loss function will 
then be:
'
t t tLOSS Z KZ=
        [ ]
'
' '
'
tx
t t x i
ti
XC
X i K C C
iC
    =        
                                          (14)
        ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
t x x t t x i t t i x t t i i tX C KC X X C KC i i C KC X i C KC i= + + +
        ' ' ' 't t t i t t t t tX RX X H i i HX i Qi= + + +
' ' '2t t t t t t i tLOSS X RX i Qi X H i= + +                                              (15)
where:
    'x xR C KC= ;
'
x iH C KC= ;
'
i iQ C KC=
Therefore, the central bank’s control problem can be seen as an 
infinite-horizon stochastic linear regulator problem (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent, 2004), expressed by:
10 Vector Z, if the exchange rate is regarded as objective variable, is written as: 
''
1 1
a
t t t t t tZ y i i q q       , where the procedure for derivation of the optimal 
monetary rule is the same in both cases.
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  0
' ' ' '
0 0
0 0
2
t t
t t
t t t t t t t t
it t
MinE Z KZ Min E X RX i Qi X Hi 


 
 
              (16)
Subject to the structure of the economy, given by:
1 1t t t tX AX Bi      
where tX  is a vector  of state variables, ti is the control varia-
ble of the monetary policy (nominal interest rate), R is a positive 
semidefinite symmetric matrix, Q is a positive definite symmetric 
matrix, A is an  matrix and B is an  column matrix where 
n  stands for the number of state variables. 
The solution to the problem in Equation (16) is based on a maximi-
zation process under the selection of { } 0t ti
∞
=
, but the equation must 
be rewritten. To do that, the loss function is made identical with the 
negative one and the “Certainty Equivalence Principle” is applied; 
the stochastic optimal regulator problem can be solved in the same 
way as the non-stochastic regulator problem.11 By applying the latter 
principle and using the transition law given by the structure of the 
economy to eliminate the state from the subsequent period, the 
stochastic linear regulator problem will be defined as:
( ) ( ) ( ){ }' ' '2t t t t t t i t t t tiV X Max X RX i Qi X H i AX Bi P AX Bi= − − − − + +       (17)
The quadratic value function that satisfies Bellman’s Equation (17) 
is given by: , where P is a positive semidefinite 
symmetric matrix that satisfies the algebraic matrix Ricatti equa-
tion, d is represented by   11d trP      , where tr  is the trace 
of matrix P and   is the covariance matrix of the disturbance 
vector t . Finally, 0X  is the initial vector of state variables as given. 
Then, using algebraic tools and deriving the first-order condition, it 
is possible to obtain the optimal monetary rule as follows: 12
  ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '2t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i
V X Max X RX i Qi X Hi X APAX X APBi i B PAX i B PBi               (18)
11  For further details on this principle, see Ljungqvit and Sargent (2004, p.113-114).
12  For derivation of the optimal monetary rule, the following matrix derivation properties are 
used: 
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  ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '2 2t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i
V X Max X RX i Qi X Hi X APAX X APBi i B PBi                (19)
t ti fX=                                        (20)
Equation (20) shows that the derived optimal interest rate is a li-
near function of the economy’s state variables, tX  and of the linear 
vector, f , which contains convolutions of the monetary authority’s 
preference parameters with the parameters of the Phillips and IS 
curves. Therefore, one may infer that, for different values of the pa-
rameters that represent the monetary authority’s preferences, there 
is a distinct optimal monetary rule.
As soon as the optimal monetary rule has been obtained, the follo-
wing step consists in checking that the solution effectively takes 
the form , finding the matrix P that satisfies the 
algebraic matrix Riccati. Substituting Equation (20) into (19), and 
after some algebraic development, matrix P will be written as: 
        (21)
Finally, substituting optimal monetary rule (20) into Equations (8) and 
(11) respectively, the dynamics of the model is determined by:  
 
1 1t t tX MX                          (22)
 t tZ CX=       (23)
Where matrices M and C are given by:  
 M A Bf= +                                              (24)
 
X iC C C f= +                                              (25)
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2.3    Calibration Strategy for the Monetary Authority’s Preferences
For the identification of CRBP preferences from the feedback vec-
tor of coefficients, f , we use the calibration method based on the 
strategy followed by other authors for identifying the preferen-
ces of monetary authorities, among which we highlight the follo-
wing: Castelnuevo and Surico (2003), Collins and Skilos (2004), 
Castelnuevo (2004) and Aragón and Portugal (2009), who consider 
the backward-looking behavior of economic agents. 
As pointed out by Castelnuevo and Surico (2003), the calibration 
method has several advantages over conventional estimation me- 
thods, such as GMM and maximum likelihood. The first advantage 
is that this method does not rely on the distribution of the behavior 
of error terms present in the economic model that restricts the cen-
tral bank’s loss function. The second advantage is that this method 
facilitates the demonstration of the effects of the changes on cali-
brated parameters.
Specifically, the calibration strategy we employed to identify •	
CRBP preferences is split into four stages, as outlined next:
The parameters that guide the structure of the Peruvian •	
economy are estimated, represented by Equations (1)-(4). 
Thereafter, the obtained coefficients are inserted into the 
structure of the economy in their state-space form, system 
(6), which restricts the policymaker’s intertemporal optimi-
zation problem;
The coefficients of the optimal interest rate rule, obtained •	
by solving the stochastic linear regulator problem, elaborated 
in the theoretical model, are calculated. Given that changes 
in the values of monetary authority’s preferences imply di-
fferent coefficients of the optimal monetary policy rule, the 
stochastic linear regulator problem was solved for a large set 
of preference values. Specifically, for a given preference value 
through interest rate smoothing i , the optimal policy rule 
was calculated for every possible combination of yand 
on the interval  0.001 1 0.001i     , with steps of 0.001.13 
Preference parameter i  is allowed to vary on the interval 
 with steps of 0.05;
13 For the case in which interest rate smoothing q is considered, this smoothing varies on 
the interval . 
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Period by period, the values observed for state variables were •	
substituted to calculate the optimal path for the interest rate 
in each optimal rule found in the combinations mentioned on 
the lines above;
The preference values of the Peruvian monetary authority •	
that minimize the squared deviation between the true path 
and the calculated optimal path are selected, that is:
  
2
1
, ,
T
t y i
t
DQ i i   

                                                           (26)
3. Results
3.1   Results of the Macroeconomic Model Estimation for Peru
As mentioned in the steps of the calibration strategy for the identi-
fication of the monetary authority’s preferences, first it is necessary 
to estimate the macroeconomic model that restricts the CRBP’s 
optimization process, given by the set of Equations (1)-(4). As the 
proposed model has backward-looking expectations, it would be 
subject to the Lucas critique (1976) about parameter instability.14 
To overcome this problem, a single monetary regime was chosen, 
specifically the inflation targeting regime for the 1999:01-2008:02 
period, with a quarterly frequency. Formally, the inflation targeting 
regime was implemented in Peru in 2002. However, 1999 was selec-
ted as the initial year for the present study because annual inflation 
has been lower than 5% and close to the tolerance interval set by the 
CRBP in the inflation targeting regime. The present sampling period 
ends in 2008:02,15 as the macroeconomic variables were influenced 
by the effects of the world financial crisis from the second half of 
2008 onwards,16 especially by the reduction in the terms of trade 
caused by a slump in the price of metals.17
14 Ozlale (2003) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) found evidence that economic models 
with backward-looking expectations applied to the U.S. economy passed the parameter 
sta-   bility tests (Andrews test and Wald statistic test), and were stable in several periods. 
15 We also decided to end the sampling period at this time due to the presence of unit root in 
the time series of the terms of trade gap for periods after 2008:02.
16  In 2008, particularly from September on, the world financial crisis worsened, with the     
eventual bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
17 Peru is one of the major world exporters of metals, such as copper, gold, zinc, among others.
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The variables used are available from the CRBP website. They are 
defined as follows:
Inflation rate (•	 t ): is the annualized quarterly inflation rate, 
measured by the consumer price index of the metropolitan 
region of Lima;
Output gap •	 : is the percentage difference between the 
quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP, through X-Arima12, 
and the potential output obtained by the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter;
Nominal interest rate •	  and real interest rate : variable 
 is the annualized interbank nominal interest rate used as 
proxy for the monetary policy rate.18 Variable  is obtained 
from the difference between the nominal interest rate  and 
the inflation rate t ;
Terms of trade gap •	 : is the percentage difference between 
the terms of trade index with the respective potential obtai-
ned by the Hodrick-Prescott filter;
Nominal exchange rate •	  and nominal exchange rate depre-
ciation : variable tq  is calculated as: where ln 
denotes the natural logarithm and tQ  is the quarterly mean 
of the monthly exchange rate, measured as the mean selling 
exchange rate for the period. Variable tq∆ is the percentage 
variation in the nominal exchange rate.
After that, the stationarity of the series used was analyzed. To do 
that, we used the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron 
tests. The results shown in Table 1 demonstrate that the series are 
stationary, except for the exchange rate in which the unit root hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected. However, exchange rate variation is 
stationary at a 1% significance level.
After implementation of the unit root tests, the macroeconomic mo-
del (1)-(4) was estimated. As the nominal exchange rate is assumed 
to follow a random walk, the estimation was based only on the IS 
curve equations, Phillips curve and terms of trade.
18 The CRBP announces the benchmark interest rate from 2001 on, within a band formed by 
the rediscount interest rate (upper bound) and the overnight rate (lower bound) which pays 
CRBP for private bank deposits.
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Two dummy variables were included in the IS curve equation. The 
first dummy, ,1yd (=1 for 1999:04 and 0, otherwise), was inserted to 
capture the largest growth observed in domestic demand driven by 
increased private consumption in the fourth quarter of 1999.19 The 
second dummy, ,2yd (=1 for 2002:02 and 0, otherwise), was inserted 
to capture the largest dynamism shown by the non-primary sector 
(specifically, the manufacturing and construction sectors), increase in 
credit lines in the financial sector and of microfinancing institutions 
in the private sector, and improvement in consumers’ expectations, 
which stimulated economic activity in the second quarter of 2002. 
Table 1- Results of the Unit Root Tests 
Variables ADF Phillips-Perron
ty -1.809c -1.809b
t + -2.964c -3.234b
tr ++ -5.59a -3.913b
ttt + -2.774c -2.844c
tq ++ -0.939n.s -1.983n.s
tq∆ + -3.923a -3.924a
Source: Obtained from the authors.
Notes:  a Significant at 1%, b Significant at 5%, c significant at 10%, 
           ns Non-significant. The number of lags in all cases was 9, elected according to the Akaike 
information criterion.
 + Includes constant ++ Includes constant and trend.
Two dummy variables ,1ttd (= 1 for 2006:02 and 0, otherwise) and 
,2ttd  (=1 2007:02 and 0, otherwise) were added for the terms of tra-
de equation in order to capture the large growth of the terms of tra-
de due to an increase in export prices relative to import prices, cor-
responding to an increase in the price of metals such as copper, gold, 
zinc, among others. This increase was based on the heated economic 
growth of China, the major importer of Peru’s raw materials.20 
19 As registered by the Annual Report of BCRP (1999), this larger dynamism showed the end 
of the recession that Peru had been in due to the negative effects of the El Niño phenome-
non and of the world financial crisis. 
20 During 2007 China became the major purchaser of Peruvian mining products with a 39% 
purchasing quota for both copper and gold (Anuário Minero- Peru, 2007). 
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Finally, as mentioned in Section 3, we imposed verticality to the 
Phillips curve by the restriction that the sum of the inflation coef-
ficients and the exchange rate variation should be equal to 1. This 
implies that any exchange rate depreciation is totally transferred to 
prices in the long run. 
That being said, the system to be estimated is formed by the follo-
wing equations: 
 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 3 4 1 5 2 , 11t t t t t t tq y                                  (27)
1 1 2 2 3 2 4 1 5 ,1 6 ,2 , 1t t t t t y y y ty y y r tt d d                       (28)
1 1 2 ,1 3 ,2 , 1t t tt tt tt ttt tt d d                                        (29)
System (23)-(25) is estimated by two methods: 1) ordinary least 
squares (OLS); and 2) seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The 
latter method is the most appropriate when there exists a contem-
poraneous correlation between the error terms. In this case, the 
stronger the correlation between the errors, the larger the efficiency 
gain of the SUR estimator in relation to OLS.21
The parameters estimated for empirical model (23)-(25) are shown 
in Table 2. One may observe that, for both equations, the parameter 
estimates obtained by OLS are quite similar to those obtained by 
SUR.
The system had a better empirical fit for IS curve and terms of trade 
specifications, both amounting to 0.76, compared to the Phillips cur-
ve, which corresponded to 0.35, measured by R2. All the parameter 
estimates had the expected sign, but the second lag of inflation in 
the supply equation had a negative but statistically nonsignificant 
sign. The estimate of the parameter that measures the impact of 
exchange rate depreciation on inflation suggests that, ceteris pari-
bus, a one-percentage-point increase in the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation at time t leads to an increase of 0.41 percentage points 
in annualized inflation at time t+1. Note that the coefficient that 
measures the impact of the output gap on inflation is significant. 
21  Note that the efficiency of the SUR estimator is guaranteed for sufficiently large samples, 
given that the smaller variability of the estimates is an asymptotic property. 
Preferences of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru                                                             25
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.1, p. 5-42, jan.-mar. 2012
This result shows the key role of the output gap on inflation, acting 
as an important mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy, 
as pointed out in this study.
Table 2- Estimation Results for the Phillips and IS1 Curves
Phillips curve IS curve Terms of trade curve
Parameters OLS SUR Parameters OLS SUR Parameters OLS SUR
1
0.5839a
(0.1572)
0.5702a
(0.1435) 1
 1.0295a
(0.1517)
1.0178a
(0.1329) 1
 0.7408
a
(0.0912)
0.7415a
(0.0872)
2 -0.0391
ns
(0.1888)
-0.0260ns
(0.1730) 2
 -0.2797c
(0.1526)
-0.2962b
(0.1358) 2
 11.771a
(2.8537)
11.551a
(2.7166)
3 0.0456 0.0105 3 -0.0653
ns
(0.0432)
-0.0407ns
(0.0382) 3
 8.0182a
(2.8849)
7.8169a
(2.7462)
4 0.4096
a
(0.1243)
0.4453a
(0.1136) 4
 0.0561d
(0.0339)
0.0550c
(0.0298)
5
0.3715c
(0.2200)
0.3761b
(0.1781) 5
 3.3175a
(1.0730)
2.8022a
(0.9422)
6
2.4195b
(1.0642)
2.4592a
(0.9332)
R2 0.3488 0.3465 R2 0.7551 0.7504 R2 0.7590 0.7589
Diagnostic test (p-values)
Q(4) 0.6331 0.5861 Q(4) 0.8770 0.8264 Q(4) 0.2761 0.2657
Q(6) 0.7612 0.7079 Q(6) 0.9252 0.8011 Q(6) 0.2248 0.2167
ARCH(4) 0.6269 0.6165 ARCH(4) 0.2196 0.2103 ARCH(4) 0.6438 0.6447
JB 0.4901 0.4854 JB 0.3836 0.4463 JB 0.6229 0.6261
Source: Obtained from the authors.
Notes: a Significant at 1%, b Significant at 5%, c significant at 10%, d significant at 11%, ns Non-
significant.  
                   1 Standard deviation value is between parentheses.
With regard to the IS curve equation, the lag coefficients of the 
output gap and of the terms of trade lagged one period were sta-
tistically significant (see Table 2). On the other hand, the coeffi-
cient of the real interest rate was not statistically significant. Even 
though this result suggests a minor initial role of monetary policy, 
the impact of the lagged values of the output gap on the IS curve is 
remarkable, implying that the response of the aggregate demand to 
the monetary policy rate is larger in the long run.22
According to the specifications of the Phillips and IS curves con-
templated herein, the effect of the monetary policy interest rate on 
inflation is indirect and takes four quarters to fully operate. Based 
on OLS estimations, an increase of one percentage point in the real 
interest rate at time t reduces the output gap by 0.0653 percentage 
points at time t+2. In turn, a reduction in the output gap reduces 
22 Similar results were obtained by Castelnuevo and Surico (2003) for the USA.
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inflation by 0.3715 percentage points after two periods. Therefore, 
an increase in the real interest rate of one percentage point at time t 
causes a reduction of 0.02 percentage points in the inflation rate at 
t+4. However, these results should be viewed with caution due to 
the statistical non-significance of the real interest rate coefficient in 
the IS curve equation.  
Another result that is noteworthy concerns the effect of the terms of 
trade gap on the output gap. The evidence shows a positive correla-
tion between these two variables, with the coefficient statistically sig-
nificant at 11%. This suggests that, ceterus paribus, an increase of one 
percentage point in the terms of trade gap, produced by a rise in ex-
port prices (or a decrease in import prices), increases the output gap 
by approximately 0.0561 percentage points in the subsequent period. 
With respect to the terms of trade equation, the autoregressive coe-
fficient and the two dummy variables were statistically significant.
Additionally, tests were run to detect the presence of problems with 
autocorrelation, conditional heteroskedasticity and non-normality in 
the error terms of system (23)–(25). To this end, Q tests of Ljung-
Box (LB), the ARCH effect and the Jarque-Bera test were used, 
respectively. The results demonstrate absence of autocorrelation and 
of conditional heteroskedasticity for system errors. On the other 
hand, the JB test showed that the residuals of the three equations 
are normally distributed (see Table 2).
3.2   Calibration of CRBP Preferences in the Inflation Targeting Regime
Once the parameters that determine the economic structure were 
obtained, the following step consisted in identifying the CRBP pre-
ferences. To accomplish that, we chose the weights that determine 
the monetary authority’s preferences for inflation and output stabi-
lization and interest rate smoothing in the loss function of the cen-
tral bank that minimizes the squared deviation between the actual 
interest rate and the optimal interest rate. The optimal interest rate 
is derived based on the true history of the economy at each time 
point, i.e., by substituting the vector of state variables in every pe-
riod following the optimal monetary policy rule.
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The OLS estimates23 of the macroeconomic model were chosen 
to start the calibration process. Following Aragón and Portugal 
(2009), the objective discount factor, δ, is assumed to be 0.98.24 On 
the other hand, as pointed out in the third step of the calibration 
process, for each value of i , the optimal monetary rule is calcu-
lated for every possible combination of yand   on the interval 
 0.001 1 0.001i    , with steps of 0.001. This calibration stra-
tegy allows obtaining 10,480 monetary policy rules and choosing 
the loss function parameters that minimize the squared deviation 
between the optimal and true interest rate path.
The calibrated parameters of the central bank’s loss function are 
shown in Table 3, where the respective weights for yand   which 
result in smaller squared deviation (SD) correspond to each value 
of i . Initially, a zero weight on interest rate smoothing produces a 
very large squared deviation. This result evidences that the moneta-
ry authority must have attributed a positive weight to interest rate 
smoothing in its loss function.
The results show that, when the central bank’s preference is incre-
ased by interest rate smoothing, specifically from the interval 0.05 
to 0.40, preference for inflation stability tends to grow, whereas 
preference for output stability tends to be mild or negligible ( y = 
0.00). The opposite is observed for weights on interest rate smoo-
thing greater than 0.50. For instance, for i =0.60, the weight for 
inflation is virtually equal to 0.00, while the weight for the output 
gap is virtually equal to 0.40. Conversely, for interest rate smoothing 
weights greater than 0.80, the monetary authority is more concerned 
with the gradualist approach to the interest rate than with inflation 
and output stability around their targets. 
Table 3 indicates that the parameters that minimize the squared 
deviation between the observed interest rate path and the optimal 
interest rate are 0.699  , 0.001y   and 0.30i  . These results 
reveal that the CRBP has adopted a flexible inflation targeting regi-
me, placing a larger weight on inflation stability followed by interest 
rate smoothing and, finally, on output stability. These results are 
23 The estimates obtained by SUR did not show large differences from those obtained by OLS 
and did not change the calibration results. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
24 For different discount factor (δ) values, there is no change in the identification of preferen-
ces. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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relevant because they are consistent with the actions taken by the 
monetary authority during the current inflation targeting.
Table 3 - Central Bank’s Loss Function Estimated Parameters 
i  y Squared deviation (SD)
0.00 0.001 0.999 13,558.01
0.05 0.949 0.001 299.29
0.10 0.899 0.001 199.99
0.15 0.849 0.001 174.64
0.20 0.799 0.001 165.58
0.25 0.749 0.001 162.25
0.30 0.699 0.001 161.43
0.35 0.649 0.001 161.85
0.40 0.599 0.001 162.95
0.45 0.435 0.115 164.38
0.50 0.217 0.283 165.82
0.55 0.001 0.449 167.20
0.60 0.001 0.399 168.73
0.65 0.001 0.349 170.53
0.70 0.001 0.299 172.59
0.75 0.001 0.249 174.94
0.80 0.001 0.199 177.61
0.85 0.001 0.149 180.72
0.90 0.001 0.099 184.51
0.95 0.001 0.049 189.64
Source: Obtained from the authors.
Observe that the weight on output stabilization around its potential 
value is an interesting result. This may not have been an ultimate 
concern of the monetary authority in the inflation targeting regime 
( y  = 0.001). Despite the low weight of output gap on the central 
bank’s loss function, its insertion into the model is important as this 
variable is key to generating information on the behavior of future 
inflation (Dennis, 2006).
On the other hand, a weight of 0.30 on interest rate smoothing 
shows the importance that the Peruvian monetary authority has at-
tached to the gradualist approach to the interest rate in the inflation 
targeting regime as response to inflation flexibility, mainly from 
2002 onwards, when interest rate movements were directed toward 
stabilizing inflation and maintaining preventive actions in order to 
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sustain economic agents’ inflation expectations (MEMORIA BCRP, 
2002).
An interesting second exercise to be considered in the calibration 
process consists in knowing whether the CRBP has demonstrated 
any preference for nominal exchange rate smoothing, as in the study 
period, the Peruvian monetary authority made important interven-
tions in the exchange rate market.25 In addition, it also serves to 
check whether the order of preferences of the monetary authority 
for inflation and output stability and interest rate smoothing re-
mains robust to the inclusion of exchange rate smoothing in the loss 
function.
Table 4 - Central Bank’s Loss Function Estimated Parameters Including 
Preference for Exchange Rate Smoothing 
i  y q
Squared deviation
(SD)
0.00 0.01 0.98 0.01 13,628.87
0.05 0.10 0.01 0.84 161.741
0.10 0.22 0.01 0.67 161.574
0.15 0.33 0.01 0.51 161.521
0.20 0.45 0.01 0.34 161.495
0.25 0.56 0.01 0.18 161.480
0.30 0.68 0.01 0.01 161.470
0.35 0.63 0.01 0.01 161.931
0.40 0.58 0.01 0.01 163.065
0.45 0.41 0.13 0.01 164.515
0.50 0.19 0.30 0.01 165.965
0.55 0.01 0.43 0.01 167.3612
0.60 0.01 0.38 0.01 168.9489
0.65 0.01 0.33 0.01 170.8191
0.70 0.01 0.28 0.01 172.9603
0.75 0.01 0.23 0.01 175.3927
0.80 0.01 0.18 0.01 178.1771
0.85 0.01 0.13 0.01 181.4453
0.90 0.01 0.08 0.01 185.4966
0.95 0.01 0.03 0.01 191.2529
Source: Obtained from the authors.
25 The justifications for considering this exercise were addressed in Section 2 of the present paper.
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The results found for this second case are shown in Table 4 and re-
veal that the order of preference for inflation and interest rate smoo-
thing has been maintained, with weights of 0.68   and 0.30i  , 
respectively. However, the preferences for exchange rate smoothing 
and output gap stabilization were non-significant, both with a weight 
equal to 0.01. These results suggest that: i) exchange rate smoothing 
has not played an important role in the CRBP’s loss function; ii) 
Exchange rate market interventions made by the Peruvian mone-
tary authority were consistent with the current inflation targeting 
regime, precluding any conflict of objectives that could undermine 
the monetary authority’s credibility, which is absolutely necessary 
to sustain inflation expectations.
3.2.1    Optimal Monetary Policy Rule 
According to the calibration strategy, the estimated parameters of 
the macroeconomic model and of the identification of preferences in 
the loss function imply that the optimal monetary rule, mentioned 
in Equation (20), is given by:
   (30)
This monetary rule implies that the Peruvian monetary authority 
responds contemporaneously to inflation rate movements, output 
gap, terms of trade gap and nominal exchange rate fluctuations. The 
coefficients of each variable in the monetary rule can be construed 
as the percentage variation in the interest rate due to a 1% change 
in the respective explanatory variable. Thus, an increase of one per-
centage point in the inflation rate drives the interest rate up by 0.11 
percentage points; an increase of one percentage point in the output 
gap causes the interest rate to grow by 0.35 percentage points; an 
increase of one percentage point in exchange rate depreciation raises 
the interest rate by approximately 0.05 percentage points and an in-
crease of one percentage point in the terms of trade gap pushes the 
interest rate up by 0.08 percentage points. The Peruvian monetary 
authority also responds to the lagged values of the inflation rate 
(two lags) and of the output gap, although this response is smaller 
than contemporaneous inflation and output gap values. Another im-
portant result concerns the dependence of interest rate lags, which 
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amounted to approximately 0.76. This result reflects the Peruvian 
monetary authority’s concern with interest rate smoothing.
The coefficients of the optimal monetary policy rule (30) repre-
sent the immediate effect of explanatory variables on interest rates. 
Nevertheless, state variables also have secondary effects on the inte-
rest rate as a result of their lagged values and of the inertial term 1ti − . 
These secondary effects can be measured by expressing the optimal 
monetary policy rule in the long run, given by:
                                                 1 2 3 4i y q tt        
0.595 1.199 0.225 0.346i y q tt                                       (31)
where  1 1 2 3 4 10( ) / 1f f f f f      ,  2 5 6 10( ) / 1f f f    ,      
  3 7 10/ 1f f   ,   4 9 10/ 1f f   .
The results indicate that the long-term monetary rule responds 
strongly to the output gap, i.e., an increase of one percentage point 
in the output gap raises the interest rate by 1.199 percentage points, 
revealing a procyclical behavior towards the output gap. However, an 
increase of one percentage point in the inflation rate pushes the inte-
rest rate up by 0.595 percentage points. The latter result shows that 
the Taylor (1993, 1998) principle is not satisfied. Notwithstanding, 
this result should be viewed with caution given that, in the case of 
a small open economy like that of Peru, other important variables 
in addition to output and inflation are taken into account in esta-
blishing the monetary rule (such as terms of trade and exchange rate 
depreciation). Furthermore, these two variables are correlated with 
inflation, and through its indirect effects, they eventually influen-
ce inflation rate movements. Therefore, not only can the effects 
of inflation on the interest rate be seen straightforwardly, that is, 
through contemporaneous inflation, but also indirectly through the 
terms of trade and exchange rate depreciation. On the other hand, 
similar results were obtained in other studies, as the ones conducted 
by Leiderman et al. (2006) and Quezada (2004).
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3.2.2    Optimal Path versus Observed Interest Rate Path
Figure 1 shows the path for the optimal interest rate associated 
with the preferences obtained by the calibration strategy and the 
true interest rate path approximated by the interbank rate.26 Note 
that the optimal interest rate captures the main movements of the 
observed interest rate. However, there are some inconsistencies, es-
pecially in the first periods. For instance, the monetary authority 
with calibrated weights may have maintained the interest rate lower 
than the observed interest rate for the second and fourth quarters 
of year 2000 (period strongly influenced by uncertainty over the 
presidential elections) in response to lower expectations of exchange 
rate depreciation and inflation during that period.
On the other hand, the developments of the electoral year in 2000 
exerted a strong impact on financial variables in 2001, chiefly du-
ring the second half of 2001 when the interest rate went up from 
11 to 14 percentage points. Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows that the 
monetary authority with an optimal behavior could have pushed the 
interest rate down to around 9 percentage points during the second 
quarter of 2001.
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Figure 1 – Observed Interest Rate versus Optimal Interest Rate 
Another important difference arises between the second half of 
2001 to the first half of 2002, when the monetary authority could 
26  This Figure shows the path for the optimal interest rate obtained by calibration without 
considering a weight for exchange rate smoothing given that, when this variable is added to 
the analysis, the results do not differ remarkably. 
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have adopted an expansionary behavior to keep tabs on the marked 
deceleration of the inflation rate in that period. However, it is im-
portant to note that the observed interest rate increased at a slower 
pace than did the interest rate predicted by the optimal rule asso-
ciated with calibrated weights. 
Finally, after 2002, the optimal path for the interest rate was very 
close to that of the observed interest rate. Despite that, some mi-
nor inconsistencies can be encountered after the second quarter of 
2006, when the optimal interest rate is above the observed interest 
rate, reaching a maximum difference of 104 basis points in the third 
quarter of 2007. This piece of evidence suggests that the monetary 
authority with an optimal behavior could have maintained a more 
contractionary monetary policy in order to overcome the adverse 
outcomes of the macroeconomic environment, brought about by the 
strong dynamism of domestic demand and of substantial increases 
in international prices (food and fuel), which ended up producing 
inflationary pressures. 
3.2.3    Comparison with Alternative Weights on the Loss Function
Another important analysis for the identification of central bank’s 
preferences includes the comparison of the optimal monetary policy 
rule derived from calibrated weights with monetary rules related to 
other weights. To do that, four different sets of weights were con-
sidered, in addition to those obtained from the calibration process 
(see Table 5).
The first set of weights shows the case of a strict inflation target. 
In other words, the central bank is only concerned with stabilizing 
inflation (King, 1997). In the second case, weights for flexible in-
flation targets are considered, especially those used by Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999) in which the central bank equally weighs the 
weights for stabilization of inflation and output with some degree 
of interest rate smoothing. The third case concerns the set of wei-
ghts obtained by the calibration strategy. In the fourth and fifth 
cases, Benchmark1 and Benchmark2, the importance given by the 
monetary authority to interest rate smoothing of its loss function 
is taken into consideration. Therefore, in the fourth case, a zero 
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weight was used for interest rate smoothing and equal weights for 
the stabilization of inflation and output. The fifth case encompasses 
combinations of  , y   which minimize the squared deviation of 
the observed interest rate from the optimal interest rate for values 
of i equal to 0.90. 27
Table 5 - Weights Used in the CRBP’s Loss Function
Cases 
  
y
 
i
Strict inflation targets (King, 1997)1. 1.0       0.0     0.0
Flexible inflation targets ( Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) 2.  0.4      0.4      0.2
Calibrated weights3.      0.699      0.001      0.30
Bechmark 14.  0.5      0.5     0.0
Bechmark 25.    0.001      0.099    0.90
Source: Obtained from the authors.
The respective optimal monetary rule was obtained for each set 
of alternative weights included in the central bank’s loss function. 
Thus, as shown in Table 6, in the cases in which a zero weight is 
used for interest rate smoothing (cases 1 and 4), the coefficients 
obtained for the optimal rules and the squared deviation had high 
values compared to those obtained by calibration (case 3). This result 
suggests that the Peruvian monetary authority used a positive weight 
for interest rate smoothing.
27 Dennis (2006) and Ozlale (2003) argued that optimal monetary rules provide better fit of 
the interest rate path in backward-looking models if the monetary authority smooths the 
interest rate (evidence for the USA).
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Table 6 - Short-and Long-Term Optimal Monetary Rules for Different Weights 
on the CRBP’s Loss Function
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Short-term optimal monetary rule
1f 51.141 0.142 0.107 2.170 0.011
2f 2.793 0.044 0.028 1.158 0.003
3f 3.917 0.007 0.006 0.088 0.001
4f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5f 65.837 0.515 0.346 14.233 0.039
6f 20.741 -0.128 -0.062 -4.043 -0.010
7f 35.222 0.062 0.053 0.789 0.005
8f 2.885 0.135 0.082 1.592 0.014
9f -2.613 0.677 0.763 -1.110 0.920
DQ 1.703E + 06 171.97 161.43 21263.00 184.512
Long-term optimal monetary rule 
1 16.010 0.600 0.595 1.619 0.191
2 23.960 1.197 1.199 4.829 0.360
3 9.748 0.192 0.225 0.374 0.061
4 0.798 0.417 0.346 0.754 0.177
Source: Obtained from the authors.
For the set of weights corresponding to the flexible inflation target 
(case 2), the coefficients of the short- and long-term monetary policy 
rules had values very close to those found for the optimal moneta-
ry rule derived from the calibration process. Notwithstanding, the 
squared deviation in case 2 was larger than in case 3. This suggests 
that the Peruvian monetary authority has come quite close to the 
application of the flexible inflation targets.
In the case in which a larger weight was used for interest rate smoo-
thing (case 5), the coefficient for gradualist approach to the interest 
rate in the short-term optimal monetary rule had a higher value 
than in case 3. This implies that a higher preference for interest rate 
smoothing leads to larger gradualism by the monetary authority, but 
with a larger squared deviation between the observed interest rate 
and the optimal interest rate. Another way to present the differences 
between the alternative weights and the calibrated ones is to do that 
visually. Figure 2 shows the optimal paths for the monetary policy 
rules derived from each of the cases analyzed.
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Case 1: Strict inflation target
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Case 2: Flexible inflation target
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Case 3: Calibrated weights
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Case 4: Benchmark 1
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Case 5: Benchmark 2
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Figure 2 - Observed Interest Rate versus Optimal Interest Rate 
As shown in Figure 2, the optimal path for the strict inflation targets 
(case 1) and the path for the optimal monetary rule when a zero 
weight is used for inflation smoothing (case 4) exhibit large incon-
sistencies relative to the true path for the interest rate, producing 
positive and negative values with up to three digits.28 This demons-
trates that the Peruvian monetary authority has neither followed a 
strict inflation targeting regime nor used a zero weight for interest 
28  No imposition of non-negativity of the nominal interest rate is considered.
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rate smoothing. Also, the optimal path with a positive weight for 
interest rate smoothing (cases 2 and 5) seems to follow a path that 
is pretty close to the true path for the interest rate. However, some 
inconsistencies can be highlighted. In case 2, in which flexible infla-
tion targets are considered, the optimal monetary rule varies more 
than the true interest rate path, with a difference of approximately 
145 points in the third quarter of 2006. Moreover, when the weight 
on interest rate smoothing is increased, the optimal monetary rule 
path has more lags in relation to a reduction in inflation, especially 
in the last two quarters of 2001.
Although the visual inspection of the different paths for the optimal 
monetary rules is informative, it is not necessarily conclusive, and 
more formal tests should therefore be used. To circumvent this pro-
blem, the encompassing test proposed by Chong and Hendry (1986) 
is applied. More specifically, this test compares the optimal mone-
tary rule derived from calibrated weights with other monetary rules 
derived from other alternative weights. Here the purpose is to de-
cide whether the former predominates statistically over the others, 
i.e., if the optimal monetary rule of the calibrated weights explains 
the path of the true interest rate in a more appropriate fashion. This 
test originates from a regression as follows: 
* **
1 2t t t ti i i     , 
where *ti  is the interest rate predicted by calibrated weights and 
**
ti  
is the interest rate predicted by the opposing case. To make a dis-
tinction between *ti  and 
**
ti , Wald statistic test is applied as follows: *
1 2: 1, 0H     or 
**
1 2: 0, 1H    . If 
*H is not rejected, but 
**H is, then one may say that *ti predominates over the interest rate 
predicted by the opposing weights, **ti  (and vice versa).
Table 7 - Comparison Test for Different Optimal Monetary Rules: Case 3 versus 
other Cases
                            Cases H* H**
Calibrated weights versus strict target  0.1767 175896.30
(0.8388) (0.0000)
Calibrated weights versus flexible target   0.0423 1.1223
(0.9587) (0.3376)
Calibrated weights versus  Bechmark 1 0.0438 2162.65
(0.9572) (0.0000)
Calibrated weights versus  Bechmark 2 0.0063 2.3669
(0.9937) (0.1095)
Source: Obtained from the authors.
Note: P-values are between parentheses. A lower p-value indicates that the null hypothesis is 
rejected.
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The results for the encompassing test (Table 7) confirm the results 
presented in Figure 2. The weights of a strict inflation target are 
easily eliminated because they are dominated by calibrated weights. 
On the other hand, the test confirms what has been found visually: 
the monetary authority did not use a zero weight for interest rate 
smoothing on the loss function (Bechmark 1). When calibrated wei-
ghts are compared with that of the central bank, which attached 
more weight upon interest rate smoothing, dominance is only obser-
ved at a significance level greater than 11%. However, the dominance 
of calibrated weights over those used for the flexible inflation rates 
(Svensson and Rudebusch (1999) is only considered at a significance 
level greater than 34%. As seen in the latter two cases, there does 
not seem to be clear dominance of calibrated weights. Nevertheless, 
using the squared deviation obtained from the calibration exercise, it 
is possible to conclude that the CRBP conducted a monetary policy 
by giving preference to inflation stabilization, followed by conside-
rable preference for interest rate smoothing and, to a lesser extent, 
for output stability.
4. Conclusions
Growing empirical evidence in the past two decades has shown im-
proved efficiency of monetary policy in several countries, specifically 
in those that have adopted the inflation targeting regime. Peru has 
formally used the inflation targeting regime since 2002, a decision 
that was made by the monetary authority after a significant reduc-
tion in the growth of price level in the 1990s. Therefore, monetary 
base has been put aside as a monetary policy instrument, and an 
interest rate announcement policy has been used instead. Under this 
new regime, the monetary authority, in addition to a clear period of 
price stability with public announcements of a numerical inflation 
target, is in general less explicit with regard to other political goals, 
which are driven by its preferences.
As the coefficients of monetary rules are convolutions of the mo-
netary authority’s preferences and of the economic parameters, the 
present study aimed to identify the CRBP’s preferences using a 
calibration process. To do that, it was assumed that the monetary 
authority solves an optimization problem restricted to the econo-
mic structure with backward-looking expectations. After that, the 
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monetary authority’s loss function was calibrated by choosing from 
a large class of policy alternatives, parameter values of preferences 
that minimize the squared deviation between the true interest rate 
path and the simulated interest rate.
The performed calibration showed that the Peruvian monetary 
authority during the inflation targeting regime can be effectively 
described by a flexible inflation targeting policy, giving priority to 
inflation stabilization without overlooking the interest rate move-
ments which, since 2002, have been directed towards stabilizing 
inflation. On the other hand, the concern with output stabilization 
has been minimal, revealing that the output gap is important because 
it contains information about future inflation and not because it is 
considered as a target variable itself. Finally, when nominal exchange 
rate smoothing is added to the monetary authority’s loss function, 
the order of preferences has been maintained, although exchange 
rate smoothing has had a negligible weight. This latter result has 
been consistent with the inflation targeting regime adopted by Peru, 
precluding any conflict of objectives that eventually undermine the 
monetary authority’s credibility, which is absolutely necessary to 
sustain inflationary expectations.
The results found here can be compared with those obtained for 
Brazil by Aragón e Portugal (2009), since the methodology used to 
estimate the Central Bank Preferences in both cases is similar.29 The 
preference parameters found by Aragón e Portugal (2009) for the 
Central bank of Brazil were: λπ=0.727, λy=0.073 e λΔi=0.2. Those 
were the weights that minimize the quadratic deviations between 
the optimal monetary policy and the actual monetary policy instru-
ment (Selic).
In both cases (Peru and Brazil) the bigger weight is given to de 
inflation gap, followed by the output gap and interest rate smoo-
thing. Nevertheless some differences arise. First, the value of the 
inflation gap (λπ) weight is much bigger in Brazil. It means that the 
Central Bank of Brazil is more inflation averse than the Central 
Bank of Peru. This result may be due to the strong macroeconomic 
instability faced by Brazilian economy during the estimation period. 
29 Aragón e Portugal (2009) also uses a backward-looking macro model with quarterly data 
(from 1999-1 until 2007-3) to estimate the preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil. Both 
Brazil and Peru are developing economies that use inflation targeting. 
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The Brazilian presidential elections of 2002, for example, imposed a 
strong challenge to the Central Bank. In this context is reasonably to 
suppose that the Central Bank would look more averse to inflation. 
Secondly, the CRBP gives more weight inflation soothing (λΔi) and 
less weight the output gap (λy) than Brazil. We believe that the de-
gree of commercial and financial integration may be in the root of 
these differences. The Peruvian economy is more open that the 
Brazilian economy, therefore interest rate volatility can cause unwan-
ted volatility in the exchange rate and instability in the financial sec-
tor, implying that the CRBP should give more weight to interest rate 
smoothing than the central Bank of Brazil. On the other hand, the 
higher degree of commercial openness may also imply that Peruvian 
output is more sensitive to external variables, such as the world ou-
tput, that are out of reach for the CRBP. 
Finally, the quadratic deviations between the actual and optimal 
monetary policy is grater in Peru (4.48 percent points) than in Brazil 
(1.73 percent points). It means that actual monetary policy decisions 
in Brazil have been closer to the optimal ones. 
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